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IDENTITY OF AMICI CURIAE, THEIR INTEREST IN THE CASE, AND
THE SOURCE OF THEIR AUTHORITY TO FILE
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, American Booksellers
Association, the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Civil Liberties
Union of Florida, the Authors Guild Inc., the Media Coalition Foundation, Inc., the
Media Law Resource Center, Inc., and PEN American Center, Inc. (collectively,
“amici”), by and through undersigned counsel, respectfully submit this brief as
amici curiae in support of Plaintiffs-Appellees. All parties have consented to the
filing of this brief. See Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(2).
Amici are organizations dedicated to defending the First Amendment
freedoms and newsgathering rights of journalists and news organizations. Amici
collectively represent the First Amendment interests of media outlets and
communication platforms across all technologies, and the public’s interest in
receiving and disseminating information free from government censorship or
control. Amici submit this brief because Senate Bill 7072, enacted in 2021 (“S.B.
7072”), would, were it allowed to take effect, violate fundamental First
Amendment rights necessary to preserve robust public debate across all media.
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (the “Reporters
Committee”) is an unincorporated nonprofit association founded by leading
journalists and media lawyers in 1970 when the nation’s news media faced an
unprecedented wave of government subpoenas forcing reporters to name
1
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confidential sources. Today, its attorneys provide pro bono legal representation,
amicus curiae support, and other legal resources to protect First Amendment
Freedoms and the newsgathering rights of journalists.
The American Booksellers Association (“ABA”) was founded in 1900 and
is a national not-for-profit trade organization that works to help independently
owned bookstores grow and succeed. ABA represents 1900 member companies
operating in 2400 locations. ABA’s core members are key participants in their
communities' local economy and culture, and to assist them ABA provides
education, information dissemination, business products, and services; creates
relevant programs; and engages in public policy, industry, and local first advocacy.
The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) is a nationwide, nonpartisan, non-profit organization. The organization is dedicated to defending the
principles embodied in the Constitution and our nation’s civil rights laws and, for
over a century, has been at the forefront of efforts nationwide to protect the full
array of civil rights and liberties, including freedom of speech and freedom of the
press online. The ACLU has frequently appeared before courts throughout the
country in First Amendment cases, both as direct counsel and as amici curiae. The
American Civil Liberties Union of Florida (“ACLU of Florida”) is a state
affiliate of the ACLU.

2
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The Authors Guild, Inc. was founded in 1912, and is a national non-profit
association of more than 9,000 professional, published writers of all genres. The
Guild counts historians, biographers, academicians, journalists and other writers of
nonfiction and fiction as members. The Guild works to promote the rights and
professional interests of authors in various areas, including defending their right of
freedom of expression. Many Guild members earn their livelihoods through their
writing. Their work covers important issues in history, biography, science,
politics, medicine, business and other areas; they are frequent contributors to the
most influential and well-respected publications in every field.
The Media Coalition Foundation, Inc. monitors potential legal threats to
the First Amendment rights, and engages in strategic litigation and provides
amicus support in notable cases to protect the rights of speakers and those seeking
to access speech, as guaranteed by the First Amendment.
The Media Law Resource Center (“MLRC”) is a non-profit professional
association for content providers in all media, and for their defense lawyers,
providing a wide range of resources on media and content law, as well as policy
issues. These include news and analysis of legal, legislative, and regulatory
developments; litigation resources and practice guides; and national and
international media law conferences and meetings. The MLRC also works with its
membership to respond to legislative and policy proposals and speaks to the press

3
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and public on media law and First Amendment issues. It counts as members over
125 media companies, including newspaper, magazine and book publishers, and
radio broadcasters, and digital platforms, and over 200 law firms working in the
media law field. The MLRC was founded in 1980 by leading American publishers
and broadcasters to assist in defending and protecting free press rights under the
First Amendment.
PEN American Center, Inc. (“PEN America” or “PEN”) is a nonprofit
organization that represents and advocates for the freedom to write and freedom of
expression, both in the United States and abroad. PEN America is affiliated with
more than 100 centers worldwide that comprise the PEN International network. Its
membership includes more than 7,500 journalists, novelists, poets, essayists, and
other professionals. PEN America stands at the intersection of journalism,
literature, and human rights to protect free expression. PEN champions the
freedom of people everywhere to write, create literature, convey information and
ideas, and express their views, recognizing the power of the word to transform the
world. PEN America supports the First Amendment and freedom of expression in
the United States.

4
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RULE 29(a)(4)(E) STATEMENT
No party’s counsel authored any part of this amici curiae brief. No person
other than amici or their counsel contributed money intended to fund the
preparation or submission of this amici curiae brief.

5
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
S.B. 7072 poses an acute threat to essential First Amendment protections for
the press and public. The law, if allowed to take effect, would compel private
communications platforms to carry speech that they otherwise would not, and
would allow the State of Florida (the “State”) to directly regulate how these
platforms curate, edit, or comment on speech that they host. Giving the State such
authority would permit government officials to force platforms to carry speech
perceived as favorable to the government or to pressure platforms to remove
speech perceived as unfavorable. S.B. 7072 would therefore impermissibly vest
the State with the pure power of the censor.
Amici the Reporters Committee, MLRC, and PEN America take no position
on technology platforms’ content moderation policies or practices; other amici,
including the ACLU, have expressed normative views on the public policy
implications of how and when major platforms moderate content by users,
including public officials. All amici are, however, united in their position that the
curation of lawful content online constitutes an exercise of “editorial control and
judgment,” which cannot be regulated by the state “consistent with First
Amendment guarantees.” Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258
(1974) (“Tornillo”).

6
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Accordingly, amici respectfully offer the following three points in support of
Plaintiffs-Appellees.
First, S.B. 7072’s provisions prohibiting platforms from removing or
restricting content posted by “political candidates” and “journalistic enterprises,”
banning platforms from adding disclaimers or other commentary to third-party
content, and requiring platforms to apply standards and terms of service
“consistently” to third-party posts violate the rule against government interference
in the editorial process articulated by the Supreme Court in Tornillo. 418 U.S. at
258. The Tornillo Court held that the First Amendment protects editorial
autonomy— protection that applies to editorial choices by private speakers
generally, not limited to a particular medium. Indeed, the State’s claimed purpose
for enacting S.B. 7072—“balancing the discussion”—is precisely the type of
government interference in public discourse held flatly unconstitutional in
Tornillo. Moreover, as the Tornillo Court made clear, the mere fact that a private
speaker has significant market power does not reduce the protection the First
Amendment affords to its editorial decision-making, contrary to the State’s
assertions. As such, were S.B. 7072 found to pass constitutional muster, it could
erode Tornillo’s protections for speakers across all media.
Second, while many of the online platforms affected by S.B. 7072 primarily
serve as virtual meeting places, the acts that would be regulated by S.B. 7072—

7
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deciding what speech to present, how, when, and to whom, as well as the addition
of the platform’s own commentary to that speech—are quintessentially editorial
choices. Social media platforms are specially curated environments for speech on
specific topics or among specific communities. Even those platforms that broadly
welcome speech from a wide variety of users and on a wide range of topics still
actively curate the channels of speech they provide. These platforms gather
information from the public, vet it both before and after publication, and present it
to their audiences. Editorial choices are central and essential to this process.
Defendants-Appellants, however, attempt to distinguish between a
newspaper and the targeted platforms by arguing that the former is a “unified
speech product that conveys a coherent message or offers perspectives on one or
more overarching themes,” while the latter is more akin to a cacophony of voices.
Opening Brief of Appellant at 24, Netchoice v. Moody, No. 21-12355 (11th Cir.
Sept. 7, 2021). But that is a distinction without a difference. First, the service each
platform provides is a distinct experience for a reader, listener, viewer, or other
speech consumer—for instance, some are heavily moderated, while others are not.
Second, and crucially, Tornillo and its progeny say nothing about a “unified speech
product” being a legally relevant concept. Rather, those cases reflect the reality
that, as soon as the government gets into the business of regulating editorial
discretion, it has the ability to influence public discourse to its advantage (a reality

8
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experienced by billions globally who suffer under state-controlled media).
Tornillo is concerned with editorial choices, irrespective of medium. And what
S.B. 7072 seeks to control are editorial choices.
Third, Defendants-Appellants present no limiting principle to their proffered
constitutional rule. That S.B. 7072 would apply only to large social media
platforms (at least those not in the same corporate family as an amusement park) is
a matter of legislative drafting, not constitutional law. As such, the rule that
Defendants suggest—effectively, that platforms primarily hosting third-party
speech are categorically excluded from First Amendment protections when the
government seeks to regulate the platforms’ own editorial choices about what to
host, when, and how—could significantly impair the emergence of “new media”
platforms, such as online services that offer journalists and others tools to serve as
their own publishers.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Tornillo rule is a crucial protection for speakers across all media;
were S.B. 7072 found to pass constitutional muster, it would erode the
vitality of that rule to the profound detriment of free public discourse.
By its plain terms, S.B. 7072 would force private fora for third-party speech

to publish content that they otherwise would not, would control how platforms
present the speech they host, and would directly gag the platform’s speech by

9
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prohibiting lawful content 1, including “addend[a]” to posts. S.B. 7072 § 4(1)(b),
2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2021). Worse, the legislature has explicitly stated that
its intent in passing S.B. 7072 was to combat perceived political bias by large
technology companies—that is, the State has openly admitted that its goal is to use
state power to skew online discourse in its favor. See News Release, Ron
DeSantis, Governor, State of Florida, Governor Ron DeSantis Signs Bill to Stop
the Censorship of Floridians by Big Tech (May 24, 2021), https://perma.cc/2PGGZBYF (compiling quotes from legislators about the intent behind S.B. 7072). As
such, were S.B. 7072’s content moderation restrictions allowed to stand, that
precedent would imperil protections for journalists and others, across all media, by
limiting the scope of the Tornillo rule. To do so would authorize an “intrusion into

Amici emphasize that S.B. 7072 would regulate lawful content and, indeed,
is aimed, at least in part if not entirely, at core political speech, “an area in which
the importance of First Amendment protections is at its zenith.” Meyer v. Grant,
486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). This is not a
regulation concerning “a classic example[] of commercial speech,” see Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973),
nor does it involve the application of generally applicable laws like antitrust
against a private speaker, see Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 254 (distinguishing Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945), and stressing that the district court
decree at issue there did not “compel AP or its members to permit publication of
anything which their ‘reason’ tells them should not be published” (quoting 326
U.S. at 20 n.18)). Rather, S.B. 7072 directly interferes with the ability of
communications platforms to present core political speech as their “reason”
dictates. Id. at 256.
1

10
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the function of editors,” Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258, placing the “liberty of the press .
. . in peril.” Id. at 258 n. 24.
In Tornillo, the Court invalidated a Florida law requiring publications to
give politicians a “right of reply” in the publication to editorials that attacked their
personal character or official record. Id. at 244. In doing so, the Court held that
government intrusion into the editorial process “dampens the vigor and limits the
variety of public debate,” id. at 257 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 279 (1964)), and that “a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.” Id. at 259 (White, J.,
concurring) (citation omitted). That insulation of public debate from state control,
the Court held, serves “as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power.” Id. at 260.
Indeed, such a concern was not abstract for the Court in Tornillo. The
Court’s ruling came at the height of the fallout from Watergate and shortly after a
request by President Richard Nixon that the Justice Department explore the need
for a federal “right-of-reply” statute because of press coverage perceived as critical
of his administration. Anthony Lewis, Nixon and a Right of Reply, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 24, 1974, at E2, https://perma.cc/2W2J-AJ65 (“Overhanging the debate is the
reality of Watergate, where a vigorous press broke through repeated official White
House denials of wrongdoing.”).

11

USCA11 Case: 21-12355

Date Filed: 11/15/2021

Page: 18 of 33

The choice of what to say or not say—the heart of the editorial process—is
indivisible. In other words, editorial autonomy is an on-off switch—“it is either
there or it is not.” Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Fourth Estate and the Constitution 277
(1992). As such, the Court in Tornillo applied a bright-line rule with respect to
acts of editorial discretion—“any . . . compulsion to publish that which reason tells
[the press] should not be published is unconstitutional.” 418 U.S. at 256 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
S.B. 7072 would limit platforms’ ability to remove or restrict the speech of
“political candidates” or “journalistic enterprises,” would require platforms to
apply their content moderation policies “consistent[ly]” across all users (with
“consistency” to be dictated by the State), and would restrain platforms from
adding disclaimers or other commentary to speech they host. S.B. 7072 § 2, §
4(2)(b), § 4(2)(j), 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2021). These are self-evidently
editorial acts—much like a newspaper deciding which syndicated cartoons to run
or op-eds to take, when to run them, and how to present them visually in the funny
pages or editorial section. And the danger of state censorship that animated the
holding in Tornillo is present in equal measure here—either through direct
government control of what is said or not said, or through a chilling effect. See
418 U.S. at 257 (“Faced with the penalties that would accrue to any newspaper that

12
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published news or commentary arguably within the reach of the right-of-access
statute, editors might well conclude that the safe course is to avoid controversy.”). 2
Further, while Tornillo involved a print newspaper, the First Amendment
protections for editorial autonomy the Court recognized are manifestly agnostic as
to medium and apply “well beyond the newspaper context.” See, e.g., Jian Zhang
v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). Parade organizers,
for example, have the First Amendment right to curate groups that participate in a
parade and exclude those with messages they do not wish to present. Hurley v.
Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569–70 (1995).
Moreover, “whatever the challenges of applying the Constitution to everadvancing technology, ‘the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press,
like the First Amendment's command, do not vary’ when a new and different
medium for communication appears. Brown v. Ent. Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S.
786, 790 (2011) (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503
(1952)). In other words, Tornillo’s rule against government interference with
While much of the Court’s opinion focused on the potential for chilling
public discourse, the Court conspicuously affirmed that its conclusion does not rest
on chill. 418 U.S. at 258 (“Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs to
comply with a compulsory access law and would not be forced to forgo publication
of news or opinion by the inclusion of a reply, the Florida statute fails to clear the
barriers of the First Amendment because of its intrusion into the function of
editors.”). The lack of qualification in the Tornillo opinion is a testament to just
how foundational the separation of government and editor is to our political
system.
2
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editorial judgment is not “restricted to the press,” Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574, and it
protects “business corporations” and “ordinary people engaged in unsophisticated
expression” alike, id.
Applying these principles, the district court rightly held that S.B. 7072’s
stated purpose of “balancing the discussion” by “reining in the ideology of the
large social media providers” through control of their “editorial judgments” is
“precisely the kind of state action held unconstitutional” in Tornillo and Hurley.
Netchoice v. Moody, No. 21-cv-220-MAF, 2021 WL 2690876, *9 (N.D. Fla. June
30, 2021).
Numerous other courts have likewise determined that the editorial judgments
of online platforms receive First Amendment protection. Courts have held that the
editorial judgments of a search engine are akin to “the newspaper editor’s
judgment of which wire-service stories to run and where to place them in the
newspaper,” and are thus protected by the First Amendment. Jian Zhang, 10 F.
Supp. 3d at 438; see also e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 14-cv646, 2017 WL 2210029, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2017) (“A search engine is akin
to a publisher, whose judgments about what to publish and what not to publish are
absolutely protected by the First Amendment.”); Search King, Inc. v. Google
Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457, 2003 WL 21464568, at *2–4 (W.D. Okla. May 27,
2003) (concluding that search rankings are protected opinion). And courts have

14
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expressly held that the First Amendment protects an online platform’s decision to
remove or exclude content. See, e.g., La’Tiejira v. Facebook, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 3d
981, 991 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (holding Facebook could decide whether to take down
or leave up a post because of “Facebook’s First Amendment right to decide what to
publish and what not to publish on its platform”); Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F.
Supp. 2d 622, 629–30 (D. Del. 2007) (holding that the First Amendment protects
decisions to exclude content from a search platform).
Notably, in S.B. 7072’s findings, the legislature cited “unfair” decisions by
social media platforms that “censor” certain voices, S.B. 7072 § 1, 2021 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Fla. 2021), leading to the law’s command that platforms moderate content
“consistent[ly] . . . among users,” id. at § 4(2)(b). But the First Amendment
safeguards free speech and a free press—it says nothing about fairness. Tornillo,
418 U.S. at 256 (“A responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press
responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and like many other virtues it
cannot be legislated.”). Indeed, the press at the time of the First Amendment’s
adoption was famously unfair. See Powe, supra, at 278 (noting that the press in
the founding era was “partisan and scurrilous”). But the framers, clear-eyed,
guaranteed the independence of the press because the alternative would be
intolerable to American conceptions of liberty. See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 260
(White, J., concurring).

15
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Accordingly, the First Amendment prohibits the government from limiting
editorial autonomy with respect to lawful content even when it has a strong
justification for doing so. See Jian Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 438 (“Put simply,
‘[d]isapproval of a private speaker’s statement’—no matter how justified
disapproval may be—‘does not legitimize use of the [government’s] power to
compel the speaker to alter the message by including one more acceptable to
others.’” (quoting Hurley, 515 U.S. at 581)).
Finally, as the district court correctly recognized, the mere size or market
power of a private speaker does not void Tornillo’s protections. Netchoice, 2021
WL 2690876, at *7 (“[T]he concentration of market power among large socialmedia providers does not change the governing First Amendment principles.”); see
also Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. F.C.C., 768 F.2d 1434, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(“[T]he Supreme Court has categorically rejected the suggestion that purely
economic constraints on the number of voices available in a given community
justify otherwise unwarranted intrusions into First Amendment rights.” (citing
Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 247–56)); Preferred Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,
Cal., 754 F.2d 1396, 1404–05 (9th Cir. 1985), aff’d and remanded sub nom. City of
Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc’ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488 (1986) (finding barriers to
entry do not justify right-of-access).
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Indeed, Chief Justice Burger in Tornillo discussed the then, as now, acute
public concern about diminished competition in mass media in great detail. See
418 U.S. at 251 (“The First Amendment interest of the public in being informed is
said to be in peril because the ‘marketplace of ideas’ is today a monopoly
controlled by the owners of the market.”). The Tornillo Court traced the increased
concentration of media since the founding, noting that “[t]he result of these vast
changes has been to place in a few hands the power to inform the American people
and shape public opinion.” Id. at 250. As one commenter noted, “were it not for
the Court’s use of phrases like ‘access advocates,’ a person reading [that
discussion] and stopping there would assume” that those advocates had won.
Powe, supra, at 271. But, ultimately, the Court concluded, “[h]owever much
validity may be found in these arguments,” a coercive right of access would “at
once bring[] about a confrontation with the express provisions of the First
Amendment.” Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 254.
In sum, Tornillo unambiguously forecloses the State’s argument that market
concentration alone can justify government interference in the editorial process.
Were S.B. 7072 permitted to stand on that ground, it would likewise erode
Tornillo’s protections for editorial autonomy.
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That newspapers or other traditional news outlets create a “unified
speech product” is not legally relevant to the First Amendment’s
prohibition against state regulation of the editorial process.
Defendants-Appellants attempt to distinguish Tornillo by asserting that

newspapers, among other things, “curate articles to create a unified speech
product,” and that, because social media platforms are primarily engaged in
facilitating the speech of other private speakers to one another, S.B. 7072’s hosting
provisions “do not interfere with any speech by the platforms . . . .” Opening Brief
of Appellant, supra, at 24. Not only does this fundamentally mischaracterize the
holding in Tornillo, which is concerned with editorial choices by any private
speaker, the notion of a “unified speech product” (whatever that may mean as a
practical matter) as the trigger for whether the First Amendment applies at all
would significantly endanger press and speech rights in all media.
As an initial matter, social media platforms do offer a “unified speech
product.” While they offer a service that allows private speakers to meet, share
news, express opinions, or connect socially, the platforms are not “passive
receptacle[s] or conduit[s] for news, comment, and advertising.” Tornillo, 418
U.S. at 258. They often delete content and restrict or block users that violate their
standards—which can include prohibitions against fraud, spreading what the
platforms deem to be misinformation, hateful content, and glorification of
violence, and other policies that limit the discussion of certain topics because the
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platforms have determined that those topics are not appropriate for the platform
they wish to provide. See Netchoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *9. Platforms further
use algorithms to prioritize posts and arrange lawful content in a manner designed
to create a distinctive “speech product” that attracts users (and thus advertisers—
again, much like a metropolitan daily). See, e.g., The Twitter Rules, https://
perma.cc/3F7Q-3RAP (last visited Nov. 5, 2021). And some social media sites
attach disclaimers or other commentary to posts to provide context, address what
the platforms deem possible misinformation or other policy violations, or to alert
readers or viewers to sensitive content. These decisions help craft distinct user
experiences that appeal to different groups, with “[u]sage of the major social media
platforms var[ying] by factors such as age, gender and educational attainment.”
Pew Rsch. Ctr., Social Media Fact Sheet (April 7 2021), https://perma.cc/EG32ZGRA (tracking demographic data and finding, for example, that while 48 percent
of Americans between the ages of 18 and 29 use TikTok, only 28 percent of adults
between 30 and 49 use the platform; in contrast, 73 percent of adults between 30
and 49 use Facebook); see also Analisa Novak, TikTok Exec Explains Social
Media Company’s Algorithm and Efforts to Keep Children Safe, CBS News (Oct.
15, 2021), https://perma.cc/3L4E-ZXTE (“TikTok focuses on age-appropriate
experiences and some features are not available to its younger users,” including the
ability to send a direct message to other users.).
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In any event, even if these platforms are not in the business of selling a
“unified speech product,” the acts targeted by S.B. 7072 mirror the exercise of
“editorial control and judgment” by a newspaper. Like in a newspaper, “the
decisions made as to limitations on the size and content” displayed on a social
media website, and the platform’s “treatment of public issues and public
officials—whether fair or unfair—constitute the exercise of editorial control and
judgment.” Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258. Simply put, as noted above, a newspaper’s
choice of which op-eds, letters to the editor, or articles to include is akin to the acts
targeted by S.B. 7072. The fact that S.B. 7072 applies to a platform that facilitates
public discourse among many other private speakers does not change the
constitutional analysis. See id. at 256 (“Governmental restraint on publishing need
not fall into familiar or traditional patterns to be subject to constitutional
limitations on governmental powers.”).
Further, S.B. 7072 does more than restrict routine acts of editorial discretion
relating to the prominence of a post on a news feed. It explicitly seeks to curb
what the legislation’s drafters have perceived as “bias” by “Big Tech.” See, e.g.,
News Release, Governor Ron DeSantis Signs Bill to Stop the Censorship of
Floridians by Big Tech, supra (“If Big Tech censors enforce rules inconsistently,
to discriminate in favor of the dominant Silicon Valley ideology, they will now be
held accountable.”).
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If taken to its logical extreme, the State’s “unified speech product” theory
would categorically exempt entities that primarily facilitate third-party speech from
all First Amendment protection. “But a private speaker does not forfeit
constitutional protection simply by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to
edit their themes to isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject matter of the
speech.” Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569–70 (“[A] narrow, succinctly articulable message
is not a condition of constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions
conveying a ‘particularized message,’ would never reach the unquestionably
shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schöenberg, or
Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.”) (internal citation omitted). Further,
Defendants-Appellants offer no limiting principle to answer complex questions
about, for instance, how this novel theory would apply to a hypothetical hybrid
platform that produces its own news but also provides social networking
functionality (like the early America Online). See AOL’s ‘Walled Garden,’ Wall.
St. J., Sept. 4, 2000. Or, on the flip side, what would be the implications of the
“unified speech product” concept for a traditional newspaper that permits readers
to post comments online, as many do. Under Defendants-Appellants’ theory, only
speech that is created under the control of a speaker, selected for presentation in a
specific way, and that conveys a consistent and discrete theme would be
constitutionally protected from S.B. 7072’s hosting provisions under Tornillo,
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leading to the perverse result that the government could regulate “bias” on a
newspaper’s comments page, but not the newspaper.
The examples above serve to illustrate that not only does the “unified speech
product” concept fail to capture the reality of social media platforms, it is
incoherent, unworkable, and lacks any limiting principle to cabin its scope. See
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 723 (2012) (stating that our First
Amendment tradition stands against “governmental power [that] has no clear
limiting principle.”). The command of Tornillo is clear: The government can have
no role in dictating the editorial process.
III.

The news media landscape is constantly evolving and crediting the
State’s “unified speech product” theory could lead to the direct
censorship of “new media” platforms.
Today, people are much more likely to receive news through a digital

platform than traditional print media—a trend that is accelerating. While many
Americans still get their news from news websites, social media sites are used by a
majority of adults for at least some of their news consumption. Elisa Schearer,
More Than Eight-in-Ten Americans Get News from Digital Services, Pew Rsch.
Ctr., Jan. 12, 2021, https://perma.cc/YPU9-77SK. When accounting for
generational differences, the pull toward social media is much greater, with young
adults listing social media as their most frequent news source. Id.; see also Jean
M. Twenge et al., Trends in U.S. Adolescents’ Media Use, 1976–2016: The Rise of

22

USCA11 Case: 21-12355

Date Filed: 11/15/2021

Page: 29 of 33

Digital Media, the Decline of TV, and the (Near) Demise of Print, 8 Psychol.
Popular Media Culture 329, 338 (2019) (finding that in 2016, while 82% of high
school students used social media “almost every day,” 2% of high school students
read the newspaper and only 16% read a book or magazine on a daily basis). In
short, for many people, and especially younger Americans, social media platforms
are a primary source for learning about current events and participating in open
dialogue about those events.
Moreover, although S.B. 7072 purports to be an effort to target only “Big
Tech,” the evolution of online speech platforms is highly dynamic. For instance,
platforms like Substack, Medium, and Patreon have developed services that
directly facilitate journalism by giving journalists the tools to effectively serve as
their own publishers. See Jacob Bogage, Reporters are Leaving Newsrooms for
Newsletters, Their Own “Mini Media Empire,” Wash. Post, July 24, 2020 (noting
a growing preference for direct engagement over curated newsfeeds); Nic
Newman, The Resurgence and Importance of Email Newsletters, Reuters Institute
Digital News Report (2020), https://perma.cc/DGL5-ZU2U (finding that email
newsletters are gaining in popularity, particularly among news lovers). Many of
these platforms offer various backend services, such as editorial support,
subscription management, web design, and even legal help. See Legal Support for
Substack Writers, Substack (July 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/86W6-46AC. But
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none of them would appear to qualify as “unified speech products” under
Defendants-Appellants’ formulation. In fact, Substack is focused so much on
creator branding that Substack-hosted newsletters often have their own custom
internet address, and a reader must look at the fine print on the newsletter to see the
affiliation with Substack. See, e.g., Popular Information, popular.info (last visited
Nov. 10, 2021); Platformer, platformer.news (last visited Nov. 10, 2021).
While many of these platforms may not have the annual gross revenue or
monthly participant numbers to qualify as a platform subject to regulation under
S.B. 7072 today, the law, if allowed to take effect, would nonetheless have a
significant, dire effect on this dynamism in new media. First and foremost, it
would establish a precedent that government officials may directly interfere with
editorial choices by private speakers to enforce the state’s conception of “fairness”
online, and that precedent would not be confined to platforms that meet the
definition of a social media platform under S.B. 7072. Rather, as noted above, the
underlying logic behind Defendants-Appellants’ legal position is that entities that
are primarily engaged in facilitating speech by other speakers to one another suffer
no First Amendment harm at all under a scheme like S.B. 7072. In other words,
S.B. 7072 would open the door to direct content regulation—in service of policing
“bias,” as perceived by the government—on the platforms that millions of
Americans now use to get their news. It is difficult to overstate the effect such a

24

USCA11 Case: 21-12355

Date Filed: 11/15/2021

Page: 31 of 33

precedent would have on the independence of public discourse from government
control.
Second, the mere possibility that the government could expand these
regulations to smaller platforms or other online services could chill public
discourse, innovation in both social and traditional media online, and
newsgathering and reporting. Just as the existence of a “right-of-reply” law in the
newspaper context could discourage news outlets from covering anything that
would trigger such a right, platforms may also conclude “that the safe course is to
avoid controversy.” Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257. Further, that chill would likely fall
most heavily on start-ups and smaller platforms, without the resources to navigate
S.B. 7072’s “first-of-a-kind” bias-policing regime. Powe, supra, at 273–74
(discussing the substantial resources larger publishing entities have in relation to
smaller entities). Many will not enter the space at all, while others will host
“safer” content, or avoid certain topics, to avoid drawing the government’s ire.
In short, the arguments proffered by the State for why S.B. 7072 does not
offend the First Amendment would, if credited, have profound speech-suppressive
effects far beyond just the platforms targeted by the law.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, amici urge the Court to affirm.
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